raxit
Frameworks

google-adk

Governing Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) agents in Python, zero-code.

Confirmed live against google-adk==2.3.0: FunctionTool has no synchronous call method at all — every tool call is async and flows through run_async(*, args, tool_context). raxit's auto-patcher wraps google.adk.tools.function_tool.FunctionTool.run_async, falling back to BaseTool.run_async for other tool subclasses, so every tool a real Runner dispatches resolves to permit / defer / deny before it executes, with no governance code in the agent. Python only — google-adk has no JS/TS SDK.

Run it yourself

For your own google-adk agent, install the SDK and launch it under raxit run:

pip install raxit
raxit run -- python your_agent.py

Run the same file without raxit run and it runs ungoverned — governance is a deploy-time choice, not a code change.

How it works

Tools are ordinary FunctionTool-wrapped functions with no governance code. The only "wiring" is each wrapped function's __name__, the policy resource it's governed as:

# your_agent.py — imports NOTHING from raxit
from google.adk.tools.function_tool import FunctionTool

def db_write(payload: str) -> str: ...
db_write.__name__ = "db.write"

agent = Agent(tools=[FunctionTool(db_write)], model=model)
.raxit/security.yaml
apiVersion: raxit.security/v1
agent: google-adk-bot
default: block
rules:
  - effect: allow
    resource: fetch_docs
  - effect: review              # unconditional review == defer.policy
    resource: db.write
  # shell.exec is intentionally UNLISTED -> default-deny (deny.default_or_forbid).

A denied or deferred call raises raxit.autopatch.RaxitDenied from inside run_async, carrying the reason code — the tool body never executes. raxit explain <call_id> shows the full decision record.

Real captured output from a run:

[PASS] autopatch: install() governed the google-adk FunctionTool.run_async dispatch — patched={'google-adk': ['run_async']}
  fetch_docs   -> permit  -> ran
  db.write     -> defer  -> RaxitDenied raised: reason=defer.policy
  shell.exec   -> deny   -> RaxitDenied raised: reason=deny.default_or_forbid
  audit.verify  -> ok=True signatures_verified=True signed_count=3 count=3
all checks PASS

Scope: no MODIFY here

run_async's tool input arrives as the keyword-only args mapping alongside a tool_context object, not as a bare positional dict or a tool_input/input kwarg — so argument-rewriting verdicts (MODIFY) aren't exercised here. Same limitation our test suite documents for this framework. The demo builds a minimal ToolContext from an in-memory session rather than a real Runner/LLM — ToolContext needs an InvocationContext, which needs a session_service + session, all constructible offline.

What got denied and why

  • defer.policydb.write matched the review rule; it's suspended for human approval (see Approvals). The demo runs with RAXIT_DEFER_TIMEOUT=0, so the defer surfaces as a raised RaxitDenied rather than blocking inline.
  • deny.default_or_forbidshell.exec appears nowhere in the policy, so it falls to default: block. The tool body never ran, confirmed by the demo's own call log.

Every decision — the permit, the defer, and the deny — lands in one hash-chained, Ed25519-signed Decision Provenance log, verified green with client.audit.verify(signatures=True). See Audit and Decisions for the full permit / defer / deny vocabulary and reason-code catalog.

  • LangGraph (Python) — the same docs/ops-bot story, zero-code autopatch at a different interception point.
  • DSPy, smolagents — the same story on other Python frameworks.

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